The Naval Civil War Encyclopedia

ABC-CLIO/GREENWOOD/PRAEGER PUBLISHING

Military History Series

 

March 17, 2009

 

Dear Colleague:

 

Once more, we are at the beginning stage of a new military history project, The Naval Civil War Encyclopedia.  Attached is an entry list of topics for which we seek authors.  Our goal is to assign these subjects out and have them written and submitted as soon as possible. 

 

These essays will be used in a variety of products beyond the printed book, including interactive web sites, workbooks, chronologies, handbooks, etc.  They are designed to appeal to a broad audience, including academics, students, and general readers alike. 

 

ABC-CLIO has more than 50 years of experience in historical reference publishing, and has won many awards for its books and publications.  It has also recently acquired Greenwood Press and Praeger Publishing and now controls over 18,000 titles.  Our Military History Series has earned the Editor’s Choice Award from Booklist for 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 and the Distinguished Achievement Award for 2006 (United States at War database), among many others. 

 

I hope you will consider taking on as many topics as you can.  The due dates are flexible, but I prefer to have essays completed within 60 days of their assignment.  ALL must be submitted by no later than July 15, 2009.

 

If you are able to contribute, please send me an e-mail at wwhyte@rcn.com with a list of the entries you would be willing to write along with any specific time constraints you might have in completing them.  I will get back to you ASAP to make formal assignments.

 

If you have any ideas for entries you believe are important to this project (such as individual ships) please suggest them. Thank you.

 

Best wishes,

 

Billy Whyte

Assistant Editor

 

Civil War Naval Encyclopedia

Hello

ABC-CLIO publishers have initiated a project for a Civil War Naval Encyclopedia.  Spencer Tucker is the lead editor on the project.  Paul Pierpaoli and myself are assistant editors.

We should have the final headword list completed this week.  If you know of any scholars or graduate students interested in working on this project please contact me for details.

Federal Baked Ovens – Life on Union Gunboats

Here is a brief excerpt on some research I have been doing on the Union river sailors and they’re experiences aboard the gunboat fleet.

Tight quarters surrounded by iron plating, boilers with an insatiable appetite for coal, poor ventilation, little wind and a lot of sun earned the river ironclads the handle of “federal baked ovens.”[1] Life in the river navy was fundamentally different from life aboard men-of-war performing blockade duty. Sailors, also referred to as bluejackets or jacks, of the regular navy enjoyed fresh air above deck and little danger; although monotonous and uneventful, save the occasional chase of smugglers, the deep water sailor enjoyed a much higher standard of living than his cousin in the brown water navy. The river sailors cruised close to land and became choice targets of confederate guerillas. The southern climate bred mosquitoes and disease, and particularly irksome to river jacks was the fact that blockaders were entitled to prize money from captured vessels while they were not. Naval officers frowned upon river service; even  Flag Officer Foote confided to his wife that he would rather be commanding in the Atlantic.[2] River navigation created another distinction between the two naval sectors.

The rivers of the Mississippi Valley were circuitous, shallow, narrow and constantly changing due to weather and floods. The weight of the gunboats caused them to frequently run aground; the constant scraping along the river’s bottom weakened the boats’ hulls causing leaks. Trees damaged the tall smokestacks or obstructed navigation. While the blockade sailor learned how to mend sails or navigate by the stars, the river tar became adept at: repairing boilers and smoke stacks, fixing leaks, and freeing their vessels from river bottoms.[3] The narrowness of the rivers also meant that crews spent most of their time within site of land.

Not only did gunboat crews come into contact with confederate guerillas but their closeness to land brought them in direct contact with southern civilians and slaves. As the war progressed and the boats descended further south, southern plantations were freed of their cotton as well as their slaves. Many of the contraband, the union term given to former slaves, would serve aboard gunboats. Castoffs from blockade duty, transfers from the army, contraband and even some confederate prisoners-of-war would man the boats in this new navy.[4] Although still short of manpower, enough crews existed to support the federal army advance into confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston’s precarious defensive line in early 1862.

[1] Michael J. Bennett, Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 78. Dennis J. Ringle. Life in Mr. Lincoln’s Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 47. River ironclads consumed 2000 pounds of coal per hour when cruising at 6 knots.

[2] James M. Merrill, “Cairo, Illinois: Strategic Civil War Port,” Journal of Illinois State History 76 (winter 1983): 251-52; Bennett, Union Jacks, 94-95. Gunboat crews became adept at stealing cotton throughout the war. Cotton became prize money for the river sailors.

[3] Bennett, Union Jacks, 83-85. A gunboat sailor described the Cumberland River as, “so crooked that sometimes a steamer a half mile ahead of us would be apparently coming directly in the opposite direction and suddenly turn around a bend and lo’ she proves to be going up the river.”

[4] Bennett, Union Jacks, 80. Merrill, “Cairo, Illinois,” 251;255.

Fort Donelson, better late than never

The last few days have been a bit busy with the Lincoln bicentennial, but I realized just now that I forgot to write something about another important early victory in the West, the surrender of Fort Donelson. This victory followed up the victory earlier in February 1862 at Fort Henry. An alert reader reminded me of the important role in that battle of the fleet of gunboats commanded by Andrew Foote. Fort Donelson was different, with Foote attempting to soften the fort for Grant’s troops being repulsed by the Confederate defenders under the command of Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner. Unfortunately for them, Grant extended his flanks and attacked the fort on February 15.

The Confederates attempted to break out and almost succeeded, forcing Union forces to retreat, until, in confusion, they were ordered back to their trenches. When General Buckner asked Grant for terms the next morning, Grant responded in what became one of his more famous quotes, “No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.” Buckner surrendered that day.

The victory opened up the Cumberland River for the Union army and made Grant’s career. He earned the promotion to major general and, with two victories behind him went on to greater renown in the West. February will alwasy be an important month in Civil War history, as it contains the anniversaries of Forts Henry and Donelson, as well as the birthday of Abraham Lincoln. Another victory in the West 147 years ago.

Lincoln bicentennial sale at Indiana University Press

Thanks to Rene at Wig-wags for pointing out this sale by Indiana University Press. Until Feb. 28, the IUP is offering its Civil War and Lincoln titles at up to 75% off the regular price. In addition, the Press offers free shipping on orders over $25 for this sale. I ordered four books and hope many of you will take advantage of this sale.

Victory in the West 147 years ago

Today is the 147th anniversary of one of the first major Union victories in the Western Theater. It was on February 6, 1862 that the Battle of Fort Henry was fought. This battle has many significant points to it. First, it was the first major victory for Ulysses S. Grant, who was a Brig. Gen. at the time. Second, it allowed the Tennessee River to be used as a highway by the Union. Finally, it paved the way for Grant’s eventual successful campaigns in the West.

The fort was at a significant disadvantage, as not only did Grant land two divisions to prevent escape, but the fort was partially flooded by the Tennessee and was completely inundated a couple of days later. It was undermanned and suffered from worn out artillery. As a battle, it was a major one with light casualties, as only around 120 were killed or wounded.

So, if you are in Tennessee, I would encourage you all to visit the sites for Forts Henry and Donelson, as Fort Henry led to Fort Donelson, which solidified Grant’s reputation as a fighter. In retrospect, it was a good thing that Grant chose to attack Donelson after Henry, even when Maj. Gen. Halleck told him not to do so. The anniversary of Fort Henry is a nice lead up to the bicentennial of the birth of Abraham Lincoln, which will be next Thursday.

Lincoln and His Admirals

Civil War literature is copious.  This is both a blessing and a curse for civil war buffs and scholars.  One facet of civil war historiography that is attracting more attention is naval operations.  This is a subject I am very much interested in; my master’s thesis focuses on the river ironclads of the west.

 

Craig L. Symonds’, Lincoln and His Admirals, is an excellent new book on the Union naval campaigns throughout the war.  As the title implies, Symonds focuses on Lincoln’s relationships with the U.S. naval high command and how they affected the outcome of naval policy and maneuvers.  It is a political history as well demonstrating, as so many Lincoln scholars have argued before, that Lincoln became such a strong commander-in-chief through trial and error during our nation’s greatest crisis.

 

One of Lincoln’s first dilemmas upon taking office was how to handle the Fort Sumter situation.  Secretary of State Seward argued to have Fort Sumter surrendered to South Carolina, hoping rather naively, that there was still time for reconciliation.  Lincoln, through the urging of soon-to-be Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox, opted to re-supply Fort Sumter with a naval expedition.  Meanwhile, in a series of peculiar actions on the part of Seward, Lincoln allowed his Secretary of State and two junior officers, Captain Meigs of the army and Lieutenant Porter of the navy, to undermine the Sumter expedition.  Seward had the U.S.S. Powhatan diverted from the Sumter operation and sent to Pensacola, Florida to secure Fort Pickens.  All of this was done without Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welle’s knowledge. Ultimately, the relief expedition was too late since Lincoln had warned South Carolina of the supply mission and the Confederacy began bombing the fort on 12-April-1861.  Lincoln, as he so often did throughout his presidency, learned from this episode and took full responsibility.

 

Lincoln’s trust in both Secretary of the Navy Welles and his assistant Gustavus V. Fox proved invaluable.  The Welles-Fox adept administration of naval affairs throughout the war allowed Lincoln to focus on other matters, mainly the army and its long list of incompetent political officers.  Lincoln and His Admirals is a welcome addition to Civil War navy historiography.

 

Some other Civil War naval books on my shelf waiting to be read are:

 

Gustavus Vasa Fox of the Union Navy: A Biography – Ari Hoogenboom

 

The Timberclads in the Civil War – Myron J.Smith Jr.

 

Blue and Gray Navies: The Civil War Afloat – Spencer C. Tucker

 

Island No.10: Struggle for the Mississippi Valley – Larry J. Daniel

 

Happy New Year to everyone and I concur with Dan lets resolve to do more research and writing on the Civil War!

 

 

GREED IS GOOD: PROFESSOR ALEXANDER BACHE AND THE UNION NAVAL BLOCKADE BOARD OF 1861

On 17 April 1861, in response to Lincoln’s call for volunteers, Confederate President Jefferson Davis issued a proclamation calling for private vessels to be issued letters of marque, “under the Seal of the Confederate States of America.”  Like the privateers of the American War for Independence, letters of marque gave private vessels permission to raid and capture enemy shipping with the crew and the government sharing a percentage of the profits.  Lincoln countered with a call for a naval blockade of the Southern ports in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.

 

Shortly after the naval blockade proclamation, a Union Blockade Board was established at the urging of Professor Alexander Dallas Bache. Bache, great-grandson of Benjamin Franklin and 1825 Graduate of the United States Military Academy, was superintendent of the United States Coast Survey, a forerunner to the modern National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  The United States Coast Survey was the only organization with extensive nautical maps of the United States coastline and its major inland rivers; because of this Bache and his staff were inundated with requests from the Navy Department for these charts.  Bache, afraid that his beloved Coast Survey organization would be disbanded due to the War, engaged his friend, Commander Charles Henry Davis, and suggested a joint military board to discuss coastal operations. He subtlety used the overwhelming requests for charts by the Navy as an excuse to set up a joint commission on naval strategy and ensure that his department was involved. Chief Clerk of the Navy, Gustavus Vasa Fox, who would be appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy on 1 August 1861, and Secretary of the Navy  Gideon Welles embraced this idea.  The board was comprised of four members with: Captain Samuel F. DuPont serving as president, Commander Davis as secretary, representing the Army Engineers was Major John G. Barnard, and Bache was the fourth member. 

 

Secretary Welles outlined the mission of the Board. He emphasized that an effective blockade must be constructed from the Chesapeake Bay to Key West, Florida and from Key West to southern Texas.  The day of the sail ship was gone and a naval blockade conducted with steam ships would require frequent refueling, consequently, a means to secure two or more ports as fuel and maintenance depots would be imperative.  The Board recommended seizing two Atlantic Coast ports as bases of operations; this would be conducted in cooperation with the Army.  The sinking of old vessels to block access to certain channels and ease the constraints on naval ships was proposed.  They also suggested dividing command of the Atlantic Blockade Squadron into two sections making it more manageable; the same was recommended for the Gulf Blockade Squadron.  Although the Blockade Board did not specify the number of ships and men that would be required, it addressed the fundamental problems of logistics.  The Navy Department adopted the new command structure, and began cooperating with the War Department to plan amphibious operations.  Perhaps the greatest significance of the Union Blockade Board lies in the fact that Secretary Gideon Welles continued to use the committee method to solve problems throughout the War.

 

Professor Bache’s vision, or perhaps selfish motivation, produced one of the most successful military commissions in United States history and would set the tone for Union naval strategy throughout the Civil War. Indeed, greed is good.

 

For an excellent account of the naval board see:

Weddle, Kevin J. “The Blockade Board of 1861 and Union Naval Strategy.” Civil War History 48 (2002): 123 – 142.

Weddle notes of the irony, “that the Union Army, with a well developed bureaucracy, a body of strategic writing and theory, and a general-in-chief, was unable to formulate a coherent military strategy until the war was almost three years old.” The Navy created one in a few months.

 

The Board’s actual reports are located in:

U.S. Navy Department. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War  of the Rebellion. 33 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894. Reprint, Harrisburg: The National Historical Society, 1987.

Series I, Volume 12, 195-206.

Yankee Gunboats Make Their Imprint At Fort Henry

On 28 January 1862, Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote proposed to take Fort Henry on the Tennessee River with four newly built ironclads. This proposal was made in a letter to Major General Henry Wager Halleck. In it, Foote explicitly states that it was his idea, and not General Ulysses S. Grant’s, to attack the fort – evidence of the uneasy relationship between Grant and Halleck. Halleck finally relented and ordered Foote to make ready for the assault.

The ironclads Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, and Foote’s flagship St. Louis led the assault, with the woodclads Tyler, Conestoga, and Lexington in support. The ironclads steamed parallel to one another in order to reduce exposure from the fort’s guns. Foote stressed to his officers the importance of accurate firing. Careless firing wasted ammunition, but more importantly, it boosted the enemy’s morale and would encourage their resolve to fight. Foote appreciated the psychological effect these floating juggernauts would have when their massive firepower rained down accurately on the fort.

The naval attack was supposed to be coordinated with a land attack by General Grant’s army, but they were bogged down on muddy roads. The flotilla opened fire on Fort Henry from 1700 yards on 6 February 1862. One hour and fifteen minutes later, a white flag was raised above the fort. Seven of the eleven guns placed at the fort were disabled; the battle was a complete naval victory.

Upon site of the gunboats, Confederate Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, commanding the fort, reported, “I had no hope of being able, successfully, to defend the fort against such overwhelming odds, both in point of numbers and in caliber of guns.” He ordered all troops except for the artillery detachment to Fort Donelson and decided on a delaying action.

The Union suffered seventy-three casualties, twenty-nine of which occurred on the gunboat Essex when its boiler was struck. The Confederacy suffered twenty-one casualties and sixty prisoners. The gunboats were, by no means, invincible; the Cincinnati was hit by thirty-one shots, Essex received fifteen shots, St. Louis caught seven and Cairo collected six.

From a tactical point of view, the fort was a poor collection of earthworks that made easy targets for the gunboats. It was also built in a very poor location with part of it underwater; the defenders actually rowed out from the fort to surrender to Flag Officer Foote. From a psychological stand point, the gunboat’s swift conquest of Fort Henry struck fear into the Confederates. Immediately following the capitulation, Foote sent the three woodclads under command of Lieutenant Phelps up the Tennessee River. This expedition steamed into the heart of Dixie – all the way to Muscle Shoals, Alabama. In four days, they captured three rebel gunboats and forced the enemy to burn six others. There was no doubt as to which side controlled the rivers.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Confederate forces in the west, was discouraged by the success of the gunboats. In a letter to Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin, he reports that earthworks are no match for the river navy and predicts that Fort Donelson will fall to the gunboats without the assistance of the army. The river fleet will not fare so well at Fort Donelson, but that is for another post. The victory at Fort Henry and the incursion into the deep south via the Tennessee River caused deep apprehension for the Confederate military and forced them to rethink their strategy in the west.

For more on Fort Henry:

U.S. Navy Department. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. 33 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894. Reprint, Harrisburg: The National Historical Society, 1987.

Series I, Volume 22 – contains most of the river operations.

Walke, Henry. “The Gun-Boats at Belmont and Fort Henry.” In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Thomas Yoseloff Inc., 358 –367. New York: The Century War Series, 1956.

Milligan, John D. “From Theory to Application: The Emergence of the American Ironclad War Vessel.” Military Affairs 48 (July 1984): 126 – 132.

—. Gunboats Down the Mississippi. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1965.

Review of Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy by Gary D. Joiner

Joiner, Gary D. Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy: The Mississippi Squadron. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. 224 pp. Photographs, maps. ISBN 10: 0-7425-5098-2 $24.95

History professor Gary Joiner has written a wonderful work discussing the role played by the navy in securing the Mississippi River for the Union during the Civil War. Joiner has added to the historiography on both the Civil War and naval history in general through this detailed account that leaves the reader with knowledge on a relatively unknown subject of Civil War history.

Joiner notes in his preface that the Union navy on the Mississippi River is one of the least studied aspects of the war. He argues for the importance of studying this topic by claiming that the Union may have lost the war in the West and possibly the East if not for the actions of the navy in supporting the land campaign in the West.(p. xi) Throughout the book, Joiner does an excellent job of providing a vast amount of information on this overlooked area, as well as proving the validity of his thesis.

He begins his examination by presenting a background history on the initial Union strategy, the Anaconda Plan, and the major players involved (Gideon Welles, Gustavas Fox, and Winfield Scott), including brief biographies, as well as a brief history of the American navy. He then describes, with incredible detail, the creation of the first vessels that made up the gunboat fleet and the men behind them. Joiner not only discusses the specifications of the vessels, but also delves into the personal squabbles among various persons involved in the creation of these first crafts.

Joiner then tackles the navy’s role in the rivers as the war heats up in the West. He devotes chapters to the major events of the Western Theater of the war. He first focuses on the early stage of the war in the West, with Forts Henry and Donelson, and Shiloh, the capture of New Orleans and the lower valley, as well as failed early attempts at seizing Vicksburg. He then discusses in great detail the role of the brown water navy during the Vicksburg Campaign and later Red River Valley Campaign, finally culminating in the end of the war. Along the journey, Joiner introduces several important figures (including Admirals Andrew Foote and David Dixon Porter) and vessels mostly forgotten by history. Readers will enjoy the vivid detail provided for naval battles, as heroic officers lead their vessels into many battles on the rivers, sometimes with disastrous results.

Joiner’s scholarship is very solid, with notes appearing at the end of each chapter. His bibliography is solid, with many primary sources used in his research, including The War of the Rebellion: the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies and the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion. His secondary sources are a good collection, with many being recent works, which provide his book with a solid historiography to draw upon on Civil War naval history. His use of photographs is quite helpful, as they illustrate the many ships that he mentions in his work. The only area that he seems to lack in is newspapers, citing only four newspapers in his bibliography. While this is not a major problem and may result from most newspapers not covering the story, it would be interesting to read what Northern papers and more Southern papers wrote about the brown water navy.

Overall, Gary Joiner has greatly added to the historiography of Civil War naval history and has hopefully shed enough light on the subject to motivate other scholars to research the subject further. This book is worth reading by many audiences, including professional historians, Civil War buffs, naval history enthusiasts, and those interested in early examples of joint force operations. This books is also recommended for use by educators for classes dealing with the Civil War, as it provides a new angle for students studying the war and is an easy read. Mr. Lincoln’s Brown Water Navy is one book that readers will find hard to put down.